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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEONA M. NELSON MARTIN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
"'•' vs. 
GEORGE L. NELSON, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 12, 1971, Plaintiff-Respondent filed an 
action in the District Court of Salt Lake County to 
renew judgments previously granted against Defend-
ant-Appellant for back child support. On August 27, 
1971, Defendant-Appellant was personally served 
with summons and complaint by Mr. Gordon M. 
Keenoy, Deputy Sheriff of Los Angeles, County, Cali-
Case 
No. 
13805 
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fornia. Defendant-Appellant does not deny in Ms 
brief nor did he deny below this personal service of 
process or that he was fully informed of the nature 
of the proceedings filed against him. However, no 
answer to Plaintiff-Respondent's complaint was ever 
filed by Defendant-Appellant. On November 9, 1973, 
a default judgment was taken against Defendant-
Appellant, after which time Defendant-Appellant's 
counsel made a special appearance before the lower 
court seeking to vacate the judgment. The basis for 
this special appearance contesting the judgment was 
that the court was without jurisdiction. The District 
Court denied Appellant's motion. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WERE 
FULLY AND ADEQUATELY PROTECTED 
BELOW AND THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
OVER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
A. As between the parties to a lawsuit and their 
privies, the process server's return is conclusive in 
the absence of fraud and cannot he rebutted by 
extrinsic evidence. 
The previous statement represents the majority 
position of state tribunals throughout the United 
States. The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated 
in Clarke Rradstmet, 104 A.2d 739 (N.H. 195*1, 
2 
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[ l i t has long been the law in New Ham-
shire that between the parties to a suit and 
those claiming under them the return of the 
sheriff of matters material to be returned is 
so far conclusive evidence that it cannot be 
contradicted for the purpose of invalidating 
the sheriffs proceeding or defeating any right 
acquired under them. Ibid, at 741 of A.2d. 
In an action to subject certain real property con-
veyed to defendant's spouse to plaintiffs judgment, 
the highest tribunal of Virginia similarly held. 
The Court stated, "The sheriffs return disclosed 
that this motion for judgment was served upon 
the [Defendants] personally. . . . No fraud or 
collusion being involved, Defendants concede that the 
return imports a verity and thus cannot be assailed/' 
Childress v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 194 
Va. 191 (1952). As Defendant-Appellant points out 
in his brief, the notarized return of Keenoy purports 
to satisfy all of the statutory requisites. Defendant-
Appellant does not allege any fraud or collusion on 
the part of Keenoy or Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Hollinger v. Hollinger, 416 Pa. 473, 206 A.2d 1 
(1965), involved an automobile accident case in 
which the defendant claimed improper service. In 
its dicta the court stated the general rule concerning 
the conclusiveness of a process server's return. It 
stated, "Clin the absence of fraud, the return of 
service of a sheriff, which is full and complete on its 
% 
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face, is conclusive and immune from attack by 
extrinsic evidence." Ibid, at 475. 
In 1971, the Kansas Supreme Court had before 
it a situation not unlike the present. There the 
defendant-appellant waited until after judgment to 
attack the veracity of the process server's return. The 
court conceded that the appellant might have been 
able to rebut the return prior to judgment. However, 
the Court went on to hold, "The general rule [is] 
that a sheriff's return of summons may not be im-
peached by oral testimony after judgment as to 
matters therein recited, which were clearly within 
the sheriff's personal knowledge. . . ." Haley v. 
Hershberger, 207 Kan. 459, 485 P.2d 1321 (1971). 
(Emphasis added) The Defendant-Appellant does 
not maintain that any of the return's alleged defects 
were not within the personal knowledge of Keenoy. 
This general rule as stated in Haley, supra, is espe-
cially applicable to a situation like the present where 
the defendant is personally served with process, is 
properly put on notice of the plaintiff's claims, and 
merely waits for over two full years before choosing 
to do anything. Thus, even if this court were to 
adopt the more liberal view as espoused in Defendant-
Appellant's brief, a Defendant should not be allowed 
to wait until after the entry of judgment to contend 
that the lower Court was without jurisdiction. The 
present situation is a far cry from the cases cited in 
Defendant-Appellant's brief where the chances of sub-
4 
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stantial injustice were very real if a strict adherence 
to the majority position were applied. This will be 
more fully discussed below. 
B. Defendant-Appellant has failed to present 
sufficient evidence to rebut the truthfulness of the 
process server's return. 
A 1965 decision of the Montana Supreme Court 
clearly sets forth the standard for rebuttal of returns. 
The Court stated that in order to rebut the truthful-
ness of the return requires "more than a little proof, 
it must be clear, unequivocal and convincing." 
Sewell v. Beatrice Foods Co., 400 P.2d 892, 894. In 
the present situation the only proof of improper serv-
ice comes in the form of an affidavit of the Defendant-
Appellant and from a copy of the complaint, which 
Appellant claims to be the one left with him on 
August 27, 1971. On the other hand the process 
server's return, which was sworn to only five days 
after service was made, states that all of the proper 
information was placed upon the copy of the com-
plaint left with the Defendant-Appellant. Due to 
the lapse of time, it would have been an effort in 
futility for Plaintiff-Respondent to attempt to have 
a more current affidavit prepared for officer Keenoy. 
The lower court was, thus, faced with choosing 
between two conflicting affidavits, one made five 
days after service and one sworn to two years later. 
The Pennsylvania Court in Hollinger, supra, although 
# 
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adopting the conclusive rule, made a statement which 
applies regardless of the standard. It stated: 
[There is] a presumption that a sheriff, 
acting in the course of his official duties, acts 
with proprietjr and, therefore, when the sheriff 
in the course of such official duties makes a 
statement, by way of an official return, such 
statement is given conclusive effect. Hollingery 
supra, at 475. 
In addition, there was one very critical factor 
which must have been considered by the lower court. 
If the facts were as Appellant has contended, then 
why would he wait two full years to contest the 
service of process? Would it not have been more 
prudent for Defendant-Appellant to strike at the 
allegedly defective service at the first possible 
moment? With all of these various factors to consider 
the lower court had ample basis for holding as it did. 
The Defendant-Appellant failed to carry its heavy 
burden of overcoming the presumption of veracity 
of the process server's return. 
;
 C. No Substantial Prejudice was caused to De-
fendant-Appellant by the Proceedings Below. 
{<
 'Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 
16 Utah M 407, 402 P.2 703 (1965), is cited in 
Defendant-Appellant's brief as standing for the 
proposition that the formalities of proper service must 
6 
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be strictly followed. However, a closer look at that 
decision indicates otherwise. The Court started out 
with the following basic premise: "It is true that our 
new rules of civil procedure were intended to elimi-
nate undue emphasis on technicalities and to provide 
liberality in procedure to the end that disputes be 
heard and determined on their merits." Ibid, at 704 
of P.2d. This statement is in accord with Rule 1 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads in 
part, 4iThey [the Rules] shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action." The Court in Tolbert, 
supra, went on to state, "Liberality in their interpre-
tation and application should be indulged where no 
prejudice or disadvantage to anyone results. . . ." 
Defendant-Appellant was not misled as was the 
Defendant in Tolbert, supra. The Defendant-
Appellant here was personally served with summons 
and complaint, had the opportunity to know of the 
allegations being made against him, knew the court 
in which the action was being prosecuted, and had 
over two full years to file his answer putting the 
matter at issue. There was no substantia] prejudice 
or disadvantage to Defendant-Appellant. Therefore, 
even if the facts of service were as Defendant-Appel-
lant alleges, he should not be allowed to attack the 
jurisdiction of the lower court after judgment. The 
only substantial prejudice that would result from 
such a ruling would be to Plaintiff-Respondent due 
7: 
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to the running of the statute of limitations against 
most of the judgments for child support alleged in 
Plaintiff-Respondent's complaint. . w 
' D. Defendant-Appellant waived his right to con-
test the alleged defects in service. 
Rees v. Scott, 8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 877, cited 
in Defendant-Appellant's brief, held that the failure 
of a deputy sheriff to date the copy of a ten-day 
summons left with the defendant was fatally defec-
tive. However, a simple application of that decision 
is not in order. The Court there placed heavy 
emphasis upon the fact that use was made of a ten-
day summons, which made the time factor more 
crucial. It should also be noted that the defendant 
in that case brought a motion to quash the summons 
prior to judgment. The alleged jurisdiction defect 
was questioned at the earliest possible moment in 
the proceedings. The authors of American Juris-
prudence state the general rule concerning objections 
to formal defects of service as follows: 
*
v
 Formal defects and irregularities in process 
.. - or the service thereof must be taken advantage 
:* of at the first opportunity, and before any 
further step in the cause is taken, otherwise 
they will be held to have been waived . . . 
62 Am, Jur.2d "Process" at 944 (1972). 
Therefore, even if it were assumed arguendo that 
there were defects in the service of sufficient magni-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tude to destroy the lower court's jurisdiction, Defend-
ant-Appellant waived the right to object to said 
defects by waiting for over two full years and after 
judgment was entered. 
POINT II 
THE SUMMONS WAS NOT DEFECTIVE NOR 
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 78-27-27, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953). 
Section 78-27-27 U.C.A. (1953), reads in part as 
follows: "No default shall be entered [against a 
nonresident] until the expiration of at least thirty 
days after service. . . ." In the instant action default 
was not entered for over two full years; therefore, 
there was no violation of the statutory requirements. 
The mere fact that the summons upon its face gave 
20 days instead of 30 in which to answer does not 
destroy the jurisdiction of the lower court. 
The following quotation represents the majority 
position: 
It may be said . . . that in the majority of 
the cases considering the fact that the return 
day of process is mistakenly or defectively 
stated, the rule seems to be that it does not 
render the process void, but only voidable. 62 
Am.lur. 2d "Process" at 797 (1972). 
Defendant-Appellant could have made a special 
appearance after he was personally served with sum-
9 
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mons and complaint to render the irregularity void-
able; however, as with the defects discussed under 
Point I, he chose to do nothing. He should not be 
allowed at this late date to destroy the court's juris-
diction. 
Krueger v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 772,'48 N.W.2d 266 
(1951), was a case in which the original notice served 
upon defendant stated that defendant had only 20 
days to appear, while the procedural rules called for 
30 days. Defendant made a special appearance claim-
ing that the notice was invalid, and the lower court 
agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the defect was a mere irregularity and did not make 
the service a nullity. After a fairly extensive review 
of cases from other jurisdictions the Court stated: 
The defendant was entitled to thirty days 
- • to appear; but he was entitled to no more than 
that. " 
_ _ _ The fact that the notice as served upon 
':\"'Z defendant fixed 20 days, instead of 30 for his 
appearance, does not change the rule. Ibid, at 
;
 In 1969, the Oregon Supreme Court had before it 
a case very similar to the present. In State ex rel. 
Kalich v. Bryson, 253 Or. 418, 453 P.2d 659 (1969), 
the defendants were personally served out of state. 
The summons failed to designate the time in which 
defendants were required to appear, although the 
10 
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process was correct in all other respects. The court 
said cthat the critical issue was notice to the defend-
ants. It held: 
We do not think that the failure to give 
[defendants] notice of the time in which to 
appear or answer invaded any interest of 
theirs worthy of protection to such an extent 
that the court did not have ,|urisdiction
 %. „. . 
Ibid, at 420. 
The court stated that as long as the lower court's 
refusal to quash summons did not deprive the defend-
ants of legally protected rights, there was no reason 
for the lower court to say that it was without juris-
diction. 
As with the discussion under Point I, Defendant-
Appellant has waived his right to contest the irregu-
larity of the number of days in which to respond. If 
Defendant-Appellant had any real defenses to the 
allegations of the complaint and had wished to com-
plain of the defective summons, he should have 
stepped forward prior to entry of judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully concludes that 
the lower court obtained personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant-Appellant and that its decision should be 
ft 
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given full force and effect. Defendant-Appellant 
failed to successfully rebut the allegations made by 
Officer Keenoy regarding the service of process. Even 
if the defects complained of by Defendant-Appellant 
were sufficient to deprive him of substantial justice 
and thus make the service defective, which they were 
not, Defendant-Appellant has waived his right to 
object to said defects by his failure to come forth 
earlier in the proceedings. 
Therefore, the lower court's ruling should be 
upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, , 
n , MM C= ! GAYLE DEAN HUNT AND 
-;•'••••'• ; •'•' M I K E L M . B O L E Y 
,; ,%> , Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
7Y) '» ; •" { y s/t}-) 
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